CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN THE THIRD-WORLD

This article developed from research undertaken in the Central America n states of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua . Developments in the region were assessed in order to determine the e xtent to which a re-conceptualisation of the traditional understanding of security was needed. The lack of case study material was considere d a major weakness of some recent work on the on the concept.(1) This study was informed by relevant historical information, drawn mainly fr om the post-World War Two period, although special attention was paid to recent times. Analysis of interpretations of the Central American C risis (the name often used to describe the period of prolonged tension in the region beginning in 1979 and continuing into the early 1980s) suggested weakness in the predominant position of security as a concep t within International Relations. Before the crisis, Central America h ad not attracted much attention and its apparent geopolitical irreleva nce saw it characterised as an unimportant region of 'banana republics ' (a term. first used by US humorist O Henry) ruled by dictators. Anal ysis rarely reached beyond such stereotypes. However, the Nicaraguan R evolution of 1979, and the gathering strength of revolutionary groups in Fl Salvador, soon stimulated intense academic interest and debate a bout the nature of the crisis, Two broad types of interpretation of th e Central American Crisis emerged, with some overlap. First, those whi ch blamed predominantly external factors and analysed the situation in an international context. Second, explanations which concentrated on the internal dynamics of the crisis as a domestic political problem. T he former category used a predominantly traditional security-strategic studies approach to analyse the region's problems. Central America wa s seen in an East-West context, as an arena of superpower conflict. Th is view is particularly associated with the Reagan administration. In the campaign leading to Reagan's first presidency 'the insurgency in E l Salvador was portrayed as resulting primarily from Cuban and Soviet subversion rather than domestic social and political conditions'.(2) T hat the region's conflicts had indigenous roots was denied or subsumed in the much more immediate and crucial problems of managing the delic ate Cold War balance or implementing the so-called Reagan Doctrine of 'rolling back' communism.