Family practice physicians read a case vignette describing a patient w
ith a history of lung cancer, a new transient neurological disturbance
, and a normal computerized tomographic (CT) scan of the head. They th
en estimated the probabilities of two diagnoses: transient ischemic at
tack (TIA) and brain tumor. Probability estimates of TIA were lower if
the history of lung cancer was presented at the end of the case rathe
r than at the beginning. This recency effect was found for both more a
nd less experienced physicians and whether subjects were prompted for
a single end-of-sequence probability judgment or multiple step-by-step
judgments after each piece of information. These results are inconsis
tent with Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) belief-adjustment model, which
predicts a recency effect for the step-by-step condition but a primacy
effect for the end-of-sequence condition.