INFANTS METAPHYSICS - THE CASE OF NUMERICAL IDENTITY

Authors
Citation
F. Xu et S. Carey, INFANTS METAPHYSICS - THE CASE OF NUMERICAL IDENTITY, Cognitive psychology, 30(2), 1996, pp. 111-153
Citations number
37
Categorie Soggetti
Psychology, Experimental",Psychology
Journal title
ISSN journal
00100285
Volume
30
Issue
2
Year of publication
1996
Pages
111 - 153
Database
ISI
SICI code
0010-0285(1996)30:2<111:IM-TCO>2.0.ZU;2-4
Abstract
Adults conceptualize the world in terms of enduring physical objects. Sortal concepts provide conditions of individuation (establishing the boundaries of objects) and numerical identity (establishing whether an object is the same one as one encountered at some other time). In the adult conceptual system, there are two roughly hierarchical levels of object sortals. Most general is the sortal bounded physical object it self, for which spatiotemporal properties provide the criteria for ind ividuation and identity. More specific sortals, such as dog or car, re ly on additional types of properties to provide criteria for individua tion and identity. We conjecture that young infants might represent on ly the general sortal, object, and construct more specific sortals lat er (the Object-first Hypothesis). This is closely related to Bower's ( 1974) conjecture that infants use spatiotemporal information to trace identity before they use property information. Five studies using the visual habituation paradigm were conducted to address the Object-first Hypothesis. In these studies, 10-month-old infants were able to use s patiotemporal information but failed to use property/kind information to set up representations of numerically distinct individuals, thus pr oviding empirical evidence for the Object-first Hypothesis. Finally, i nfants succeed at object individuation in terms of more specific sorta ls by 12 months. The relation between success at our task and early no un comprehension is discussed. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.