Pl. Kennedy et al., STRATEGIC AGRICULTURAL TRADE-POLICY INTERDEPENDENCE AND THE EXCHANGE-RATE - A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS, Public choice, 88(1-2), 1996, pp. 43-56
Strategic Agricultural Trade Policy Interdependence is modeled using a
game theoretic framework. The model distinguishes between the Europea
n Community, the United States and a politically passive rest-of-the-w
orld. Particular emphasis is placed on the effect of the exchange rate
on the equilibrium outcome of this game. Without compensatory payment
s to those with the highest political influence, the results suggest t
hat only modest reform is possible. With compensation, liberalization
occurs but free trade is not obtained. Simulations also indicate that
the U.S. gains incentive to reduce protection given a depreciation of
the dollar, while incentive to liberalize trade policies decreases as
the dollar appreciates.