Departing from the stated intent of the social representation approach
to give a social constructionist account of social processes, this pa
per presents a critical analysis of language use within the realm of s
ocial representations research. Three questions are posed: (a) Does a
social representation represent an object? (b) Can social representati
ons be true or false? and (c) Is social construction action? All three
are answered negatively. It is shown that object-talk is inherent to
social cognition and to the common-sensical view of social actors, but
incompatible with a constructionist position; that truth-talk is part
of collective discourse in the socio-genesis of representations, but
senseless when talking about a representation; that a social represent
ation is not a representation of an object, but ontologically identica
l with it; and that social construction happens rather than being inte
nded by social actors. Consequently, social representations are interp
reted as the significant meaning of constructive events and neither as
entities in the minds of people nor floating above a collectivity. Th
eir relationship with discourse analysis is discussed.