Harris levels two main criticisms against our original defence of QALY
s (Quality Adjusted Life Years). First, he rejects the assumption impl
icit in the QALY approach that not all lives are of equal value. Secon
d, he rejects our appeal to Rawls's veil of ignorance test in support
of the QALY method In the present article we defend QALYs against Harr
is's criticisms. We argue that seize of the conclusions Harris draws f
rom our view that resources should be allocated oil the basis of poten
tial improvements in quality of life and quantity of life are erroneou
s, and that others lack the moral implications Harris claims for them.
On the other hand, we defend our claim that a rational egoist, behind
a veil of ignorance, could consistently choose to allocate life-savin
g resources in accordance with the QALY method, despite Harris's claim
that a rational egoist would allocate randomly if there is no better
than a 50% chance of being the recipient.