THE CLOSURE ASSUMPTION AS A FIRST STEP - NEO-RICARDIAN ECONOMICS AND POST-KEYNESIANISM

In this paper I accept that just as mainstream economics can be charac terized by its insistence upon a deductivist method, so the least cont entious, most widely accepted aspects of Post-Keynesianism can be acco unted for by its anti-deductivist stance and more specifically by its tacit commitment to something like critical realism. I argue that neo- Ricardian economics, to the extent that it takes closure for granted a s a natural and useful starting point for analysis, retains an underly ing commitment to deductivism and so is difficult to reconcile with Po st-Keynesianism. By providing a criterion for assessing whether neo-Ri cardianism belongs within a coherent Post-Keynesianism I also clarify why the nature of this relationship has for so long remained unresolve d. Not until it was recognized that coherence within Post-Keynesianism turns upon methodological issues, and essentially involves the abando nment of the deductivist framework, could progress in understanding it s relationship with neo-Ricardianism be made.