STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR IN REFUGEE REPATRIATION - A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS

The authors present a game-theoretic analysis of negotiations involvin g two players: the government of a country of origin and the United Na tions High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in which the latter repr esents refugees, countries of asylum, and donor countries at the negot iating table. Ordinal preference orderings of outcomes allow the autho rs to represent the attitudes of governments in countries of origin to ward their refugees as well as the urgency of repatriation for countri es of asylum and donor countries. For alternative configurations of pr eference orderings, the authors analyze repatriation negotiations usin g classical game theory and the theory of moves, which assume differen t rules of play. They find the theory of moves is better suited for un derstanding efforts to achieve repatriation agreements in actual refug ee crises and conclude with reflections on the difficulties of reachin g repatriation agreements in recent years.