ASSOCIATIVE DEMOCRACY - DECENTRALIZATION OF SOCIETAL AND INDUSTRIAL GOVERNANCE - A CRITICAL DISCUSSION

The collapse of communism and the Cold War have precipitated a broad r econsideration of central principles of democracy and societal governa nce. This paper examines a recent contribution by Paul Hirst-a model o f associative democracy. Drawing on principles of associationalism and rational choice, Hirst sets out a model of participatory democracy, w hich focuses on general principles, economic institutions and welfare provisions. Mandatory economic democracy and a bifurcated structure of political governance are proposed. Voluntary associations are present ed as primary vehicles of communicative democracy and social life. It is argued that Hirst's formulations of rational choice and the decentr alisation of the state are fundamentally untenable: he proposes regula tion of economic relations to secure socially responsible outcomes, an d the injection of market relations into state administration to maxim ise individual choice. It is concluded that Hirst's theoretical tools are incompatible with the nature of political governance advocated. Mo reover, the fracturing of state power, in search of dubious advantages of decentralised associations, undermines the positive gains of unive rsal state action.