Recent Foucauldian theorizations of liberal practices of self, while i
nnovative in avoiding ontological presuppositions either about individ
uals or about collectivities, run the danger of ontologizing liberal e
thical governance itself, of envisaging it as internally consistent an
d self-identical. This article seeks to demonstrate that liberal ethic
al governance can never be identical to itself through an analysis of
the persistent coexistence of liberal and illiberal modes of moral/eth
ical governance. Such coexistence occurs at two levels: externally, va
rious types of subjects and various aspects of human experience contin
ue to be governed through practices J. S. Mill would have called 'desp
otic'; internally, the paradigmatic liberal subject often continues to
govern his 'passions' through non-liberal means even as both he and h
is authorities seek to maximize self-rule and other liberal rationalit
ies. It is argued that the coexistence of contradictory modes of gover
nance is a feature of governance generally. This is briefly illustrate
d by a discussion of two common mechanisms for articulating contradict
ory regimes of governance: the naturalization of distinct 'kinds' or t
ypes of humans and the geographicalization of distinct spaces supposed
ly requiring distinct modes of governance.