IS THE SINGLE NONTRANSFERABLE VOTE SUPERPROPORTIONAL - EVIDENCE FROM JAPAN AND TAIWAN

Theory: The traditional view of the single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system has been that it is superproportional-tending to produce large r seat bonuses for small parties than for large parties-because small parties face easier nomination and vote division problems than do larg e parties. A contrary view is that SNTV privileges governing parties b y giving them superior access to particularistic policy benefits, whic h are useful in stabilizing both nominations and vote divisions within parties. Hypotheses: By the latter view, SNTV should lead to subpropo rtional results-with larger seat bonuses for large parties than for sm all parties-to the extent that governing parties are large. Methods: I n this paper, I operationalize and test these competing claims at the district level, using both cross-tabulations and probit analysis. Resu lts Although there is a sense in which SNTV is superproportional, I sh ow that two large governing parties (the LDP of Japan and the KMT of T aiwan) have been significantly more efficient at securing as many seat s as possible out of a given maximum number of winnable seats, than ha ve their respective oppositions.