This paper is an analysis of a specific tradition of causal thinking i
n economics: the genetic-causal tradition. (This concept has nothing t
o do with the science of genetics but with origins or genesis.) The tr
adition was most self-consciously followed in the work of the Austrian
School, but spilled over into other approaches. Causes are viewed as
forces that originate change ('originating causes') rather than simply
sustain a current state of affairs. Hence, in this view, causation, c
hange, processes and time are interrelated. Thus genetic-causal explan
ations place emphasis, inter alia on temporal processes resulting in c
hange and emanating from changes in agents' desires and beliefs. The a
uthors present a brief history of this approach, demonstrating its roo
ts in the works of Menger, Bohm-Bawerk, Keynes, Mayer and Hayek, as we
ll as in the competition theory of the classical school. The authors a
lso outline the major characteristics of genetic causes among which ar
e that they are real mental events with a forward-looking perspective,
are generally neither necessary nor sufficient for their consequences
, may produce unintended consequences, and are embodied in non-determi
nistic processes. Furthermore, distinctions are drawn between genetic
causation, on the one hand, and functional dependence, predictive capa
city and logical implication on the other. The genetic-causal approach
is then illustrated in a number of different areas: Mises's theory of
the value of money, Keynes's theory of interest, the modem theory of
search, choice-of-technology literature, and arbitrage or discovery dr
iven processes.