EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM IN PSYCHOLOGY - KANT OR WONT

This paper critically evaluates the implications of the philosophical assumptions of realism, determinism and materialism, as proposed by th e philosopher John Anderson, for the development of modern empirical p sychology. Because of the logical problems with the alternative views, it is concluded that Andersonian realism, determinism and materialism (specifically functionalism) are the most valid philosophical positio ns for the foundations of experimental psychology. The implications of these philosophical assumptions for the nature of explanation within psychology, for the position of psychology within the sciences, and fo r ethical issues within psychology and psychiatry, are discussed. It i s concluded: 1) that realism, determinism and materialism provide the only means by which psychology can aspire to provide non-circular expl anations of behaviour; 2) that psychology cannot isolate itself from t he rest of the biological sciences without its contributions to the an alysis of behaviour being superseded by other areas of neuroscience, w hich may borrow psychological techniques and apply them without refere nce to the theoretical perspectives of psychology; 3) that the accepta nce of realism, determinism and materialism within psychology would ac celerate the process by which psychological and psychiatric disorders are recognised as being biological in basis, just as 'somatic' disorde rs such as diabetes and asthma.