In this paper, I analyze the controversy within Artificial intelligenc
e (Al) which surrounded the 'perceptron' project (and neural nets in g
eneral) in the late 1950s and early 1960s. I devote particular attenti
on to the proofs and arguments of Minsky and Papert, which were interp
reted as showing that further progress in neural nets was not possible
, and that this approach to Al had to be abandoned. I maintain that th
is official interpretation of the debate was a result of the emergence
, institutionalization and (importantly) legitimation of the symbolic
Al approach (with its resource allocation system and authority structu
re). At the 'research-area' level, there was considerable interpretati
ve flexibility. This interpretative flexibility was further demonstrat
ed by the revival of neural nets in the late 1980s, and subsequent rew
riting of the official history of the debate.