CHEAP TALK AND REPUTATION IN REPEATED PRETRIAL NEGOTIATION

Authors
Citation
Jy. Kim, CHEAP TALK AND REPUTATION IN REPEATED PRETRIAL NEGOTIATION, The Rand journal of economics, 27(4), 1996, pp. 787-802
Citations number
19
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
ISSN journal
07416261
Volume
27
Issue
4
Year of publication
1996
Pages
787 - 802
Database
ISI
SICI code
0741-6261(1996)27:4<787:CTARIR>2.0.ZU;2-6
Abstract
Infinitely repeated interaction between a defendant and a plaintiff ca n enhance the credibility of cheap talk and improve efficiency in outc omes that would be infeasible without cheap talk, The basic driving fo rce is reputation effect, If the players are concerned about their rep utation, cheap talk cannot be taken as meaningless even in a game wher e the interests of the players are sufficiently conflicting, because p ossible current gains from opportunistic behavior can be wiped out by future losses in payoff from damaged reputation.