PROFILE OF PUBLIC LABORATORIES, INDUSTRIAL PARTNERSHIPS AND ORGANIZATIONS OF RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT - THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONSHIPS IN A LARGE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION
Pb. Joly et V. Mangematin, PROFILE OF PUBLIC LABORATORIES, INDUSTRIAL PARTNERSHIPS AND ORGANIZATIONS OF RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT - THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONSHIPS IN A LARGE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, Research policy, 25(6), 1996, pp. 901-922
There is a paucity of papers dealing with the system characteristics o
f laboratories or, put in another way, the institutional character of
research organisations. Neither R&D economics nor the sociology of sci
ence, as traditionally conceived, has made much headway in providing i
nsight into sets of R&D laboratories and their evolution. Drawing upon
an empirical study in the plant breeding and biochemical industry, th
is paper presents a typology of public research laboratories which is
based on three dimensions: scientific production and visibility, type
of funding (public or private) and homogeneity of research themes. Thr
ee types of public laboratory emerge: the first, called ''research cen
tres for the profession'', is composed essentially of laboratories wit
h close ties with small and medium firms (SMEs) and industry associati
ons. The second, called ''designers of generic tools and methods'', is
oriented towards basic research and themes of general interest to the
industry as a whole. The third type, called ''basic and specialised l
aboratories'', strives to develop its scientific visibility. Contracts
between this type of laboratory and industry are mainly bilateral and
demonstrate the complementarity between public and private research.
Each type of laboratory develops specific types of relationship with p
rivate partners. The authors have identified three logics underlying t
hese relationships: proximity, market and club. The main objective of
contracts based on a proximity logic is to test a hypothesis, while th
e knowledge produced is mostly tacit and specific. By contrast, knowle
dge is entirely coded and specific in the market logic, where the aim
of the contract is to implement expertise in order to relieve a scient
ific bottleneck. In a club logic, the aim of contracts is to produce a
technical referent. In each kind of contract, the learning trajectori
es, modes of co-ordination, role of trust and degree to which contract
s are complete or not, rue different.