PRIVACY AND SEXUALITY IN A SOCIETY DIVIDED OVER MORAL CULTURE

In this article, I develop an individuality-based conception of the ri ght to privacy that can be used to protect the freedoms of sexual choi ce and intimate association. In doing so, I draw on John Stuart Mill's concept of individuality and his celebration of lifestyle experimenta tion. This formulation of the right to privacy is defended against a c ritic,led Rubenfeld, who uses Michel Foucault's critique of the repres sive hypothesis to argue that an individuality-based conception of the right to privacy will inevitably impose standardized sexual identitie s on individuals. In response to Rubenfeld, I argue that the position that sexuality is central to self-definition does not depend on the as sumption that speaking the truth about sex will set us free. The aim o f the individuality-based conception of the right to privacy that I am advocating is not to fix identities, but to open up greater room for lifestyle experimentation.