THE MYTH OF THE DIVERSIONARY USE OF FORCE BY AMERICAN PRESIDENTS

One of the most intriguing claims that has been made about the behavio r of American presidents is that they have been motivated by deteriora ting political conditions at home to engage in conflict abroad. Howeve r, we identify three problems with this literature: (1) the use of inc rements of time rather than international crises as the unit of analys is; (2) the assumption that presidents can respond to international cr ises whenever they wish; and (3) the assumption that there are signifi cant political payoffs for diversionary uses of force. We argue that f ew if any relationships are likely to be found between presidential po pularity, congressional support, economic conditions and elections and the use of force. We lest our hypotheses by looking at the political use of military force by American presidents in the post-World War II era (1953-88). We also test to determine if the causal order is not re versed and if it is domestic conditions which precipitate internationa l crises. Ultimately, we find little evidence of any kind of link betw een domestic political conditions in the United States and uses of for ce or international crises.