TERRITORIAL COMPETITION AND THE PREDICTABILITY OF COLLECTIVE (IN)ACTION

Increasing European integration, together with unemployment and the ri se of producer services, has provided a notable spur to the growth of economic strategies aimed at boosting the competitive position of part icular territorial economies - a phenomenon previously more evident in North America than in Europe. Even where, as in the leading European regions, the challenge is strongest it cannot be assumed, however, tha t the necessary political organization and commitment will always be a vailable to generate a substantial and coherent competitive response. The aim of this paper is to identify the political and economic condit ions making such responses more or less likely. Building on Olson's Lo gic of collective action, the organizational requirements for territor ial competition (viewed as the provision of-a quasi-public good) are a nalysed in relation to patterns of material interest, leadership poten tial and institutional constraints. A series of hypotheses are derived as to the circumstances favouring competitive action/inaction, and it s strategic/tactical nature. These hypotheses are then examined empiri cally, with particular reference to initiatives in an extended version of the London region, where action remains localized, fragmented, and /or symbolic in character, despite an increasing perception of the nee d for a stronger competitive position. In part this situation is attri buted to the historically weak development of local economic organizat ions and regional institutions in England, but in part also to factors which may be shared with other leading metropolitan regions.