We examined the manner in which subjects interpret experimenter-provid
ed feeling-of-knowing (FOK) definitions. The original FOK definition p
roposed by Hart (1965) is a composite of two criteria: (1) A feeling t
hat the sought-after information is known and (2) a feeling that the s
ought-after information can be correctly identified on a later criteri
on test. We hypothesized that subjects may use one or both of these cr
iteria in reporting FOK states. We found that Goodman-Kruskal gamma co
rrelations (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954) were substantially larger when su
bjects attended to the predictive aspect of FOK definitions relative t
o subjects who assessed what they believed they knew. We argue that FO
Ks are more accurate when task-relevant information is incorporated in
to the judgment. Finally, these data weaken a cue-familiarity interpre
tation of the FOK phenomenon.