MODELS OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND THE ROLE OF THEORY IN TAXONOMY DEVELOPMENT - A CASE-STUDY OF THE DSM

The proliferation of categories in recent editions of the Diagnostic a nd Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ( e.g., 4th ed.; DSM: Americ an Psychiatric Association, 1994) is discussed as an indication that t he underlying classification scheme is inadequate and unlikely to prod uce the scientific progress originally envisioned. In any nosological system, it eventually becomes necessary to reduce the number of catego ries by an organizing theory that describes the fundamental principles underlying the taxonomy. The DSM has put itself in an awkward positio n by claiming to be atheoretical. Although taking such a tack had hist orical advantages to promote the acceptability of the 3rd edition of t he DSM. it now limits the progression of science. It is argued that th e DSM should not be used as the basis for guiding scientific research programs because it emphasizes primarily behavioral topography rather than providing an explicit theory that would allow for an evaluation o f scientific progress. Theoretically driven taxonomies should be allow ed to compete on the basis of how successful they are at achieving the ir specified goals that might include illuminating etiology, course, a nd response to treatment. Such systems are not likely to attend primar ily to behavioral topography alone and would probably organize behavio r differently than the current categorical syndromes seen in the 4th e dition of the DSM.