POLICY WINDOWS AND 2-LEVEL GAMES - EXPLAINING THE PASSAGE OF ACID-RAIN LEGISLATION IN THE CLEAN-AIR ACT OF 1990

Because of the transboundary nature of most environmental problems, en vironmental policy often lies at the intersection of domestic and inte rnational forces. Yet, because domestic and international issues are u sually examined with different sets of theories and models, we tend to explain the policy process and outcome by emphasizing only one arena. Analysis of domestic policy is often dominated by process models, whe reas scholars of international relations tend to apply rational models to explain state behavior. we apply Kingdon's 'policy windows' model of agenda setting and Brams's dynamic game theory framework to the dev elopment of acid-rain legislation enacted by the USA in the Clean Air Act of 1990. We compare the explanations of these theories with the wo rk of other analysts, as well as with perceptions of policymakers by u sing data from interviews of policymaking elites in Canadian and US go vernment, industry, and interest groups. It is demonstrated that proce ss models and models of strategic interaction can complement each othe r, providing improved explanations of policy outcomes.