DISCUSSION - THOUGHTS ON MAHERS PREDICTIVISM

Authors
Citation
E. Barnes, DISCUSSION - THOUGHTS ON MAHERS PREDICTIVISM, Philosophy of science, 63(3), 1996, pp. 401-410
Citations number
13
Categorie Soggetti
History & Philosophy of Sciences","History & Philosophy of Sciences
Journal title
ISSN journal
00318248
Volume
63
Issue
3
Year of publication
1996
Pages
401 - 410
Database
ISI
SICI code
0031-8248(1996)63:3<401:D-TOMP>2.0.ZU;2-H
Abstract
Predictivism asserts that where evidence E confirms theory T, E provid es stronger support for T when E is predicted on the basis of T and th en confirmed than when E is known before T's construction and 'used', in some sense, in the construction of T. Among the most interesting at tempts to argue that predictivism is a true thesis (under certain cond itions) is that of Patrick Maher (1988, 1990, 1993). The purpose of th is paper is to investigate the nature of predictivism using Maher's an alysis as a starting point. I briefly summarize Maher's primary argume nt and expand upon it; I explore related issues pertaining to the caus al structure of empirical domains and the logic of discovery.