WHEN ELECTORAL AND PARTY INSTITUTIONS INTERACT TO PRODUCE CAUDILLO POLITICS - THE CASE OF HONDURAS

This article examines how electoral and party institutions can interac t to perpetuate caudillo politics within a democratic regime. Caudillo politics describes a political system in which patron-client relation ships dominate, and patronage is the currency of politics. Examination of the Honduran case shows that, because of the incentive structure c reated by the interaction of fused elections and factionalized parties , the system does not perform either policy or representation function s. This type of system is neither an 'efficient secret' or an 'ineffic ient secret', but rather just plain inefficient. As such, its impact o n popular faith in democracy is negative, as people come to view polit ics and the government as a source of patronage resources and not as a forum for discussing and addressing the country's problems. Copyright (C) 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd