WHY BE MORAL - HUMANIST AND BEHAVIORAL-PERSPECTIVES

Citation
B. Newman et al., WHY BE MORAL - HUMANIST AND BEHAVIORAL-PERSPECTIVES, The Behavior analyst, 19(2), 1996, pp. 273-280
Citations number
25
Categorie Soggetti
Psycology, Clinical
Journal title
ISSN journal
07386729
Volume
19
Issue
2
Year of publication
1996
Pages
273 - 280
Database
ISI
SICI code
0738-6729(1996)19:2<273:WBM-HA>2.0.ZU;2-A
Abstract
Students of philosophy have struggled with the question, ''Why should I be moral?'' Many diverse theorists have constructed elaborate logica l arguments that explain why people in general should behave morally, but have had difficulty explaining why any given individual, safe from detection or retribution, should behave in a moral fashion. To avoid this problem, the notion of a supernatural deity (one who is always wa tching and thus removes the notion of nondetection and nonretribution) has been introduced by numerous thinkers. Philosophical systems that pride themselves on being based only on natural phenomena, however, ca n make no such recourse (leading to the charge, particularly from the religious, that without a god concept there can be no morality). Natur alistic humanists and behavior analysts are two groups who have found themselves unable to invoke a deity and thus face the question ''Why s hould I behave morally?'' Parallel attempts from both camps will be de scribed and analyzed, with the conclusion being drawn that although su ch naturalists may not be better off than their more religious friends , they are certainly no worse off.