Students of philosophy have struggled with the question, ''Why should
I be moral?'' Many diverse theorists have constructed elaborate logica
l arguments that explain why people in general should behave morally,
but have had difficulty explaining why any given individual, safe from
detection or retribution, should behave in a moral fashion. To avoid
this problem, the notion of a supernatural deity (one who is always wa
tching and thus removes the notion of nondetection and nonretribution)
has been introduced by numerous thinkers. Philosophical systems that
pride themselves on being based only on natural phenomena, however, ca
n make no such recourse (leading to the charge, particularly from the
religious, that without a god concept there can be no morality). Natur
alistic humanists and behavior analysts are two groups who have found
themselves unable to invoke a deity and thus face the question ''Why s
hould I behave morally?'' Parallel attempts from both camps will be de
scribed and analyzed, with the conclusion being drawn that although su
ch naturalists may not be better off than their more religious friends
, they are certainly no worse off.