CONGRESS AND BACK SEAT DRIVING - AN INFORMATION-THEORY OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

Few pieces of legislation in the realm of foreign policy decisionmakin g have greater potential effect or are more controversial than the War Powers Resolution. The Resolution was intended originally to create g reater leverage for Congress over executive use of military force. In this effort, it is widely believed that the Resolution has been ineffe ctive. This paper uses an information theoretic model to examine the W ar Powers Resolution. Results of the modeling process allow for two ge neral assertions. First, the model suggests that the Resolution is an optimal choice of procedure by the legislature. In other words, the Wa r Powers Resolution is better for Congress than its alternatives. Seco nd, the information theoretic approach used here seems to coincide wit h an anecdotal history of the war powers debate better than do alterna tive explanations. Indeed, the analysis helps to explain why war power s legislation was not considered seriously sooner. Though criticism of the War Powers Resolution has its merits, claims for a variety of alt ernative procedural systems may be open to challenge. Those wishing to establish mechanisms for curtailing executive adventurism abroad may find it more rewarding to focus efforts on the budgeting process or on the reduction of military force structures.