THE CASE FOR INTRINSIC THEORY .1. AN INTRODUCTION

This is the introductory installment in a projected series of articles in which I shall be advancing the positive case for the ''intrinsic'' kind of explanatory account of ''consciousness(4).'' ''Consciousness( 4)'' has reference to a property of individual mental-occurrence insta nces (the ''conscious(4)'' ones) wherein there takes place an immediat e awareness of them either upon their occurrence or as part of their v ery occurrence. The immediacy or directness of such inner awareness am ounts to the absence of mental mediation by any other occurrent awaren ess. An account of consciousness(4) that properly comes under the head ing of ''intrinsic theory'' is distinguished by the thesis that a ment al-occurrence instance's being consciou(4)is an intrinsic property rat her than an external-relational property of that mental-occurrence ins tance. My hope for the present series of articles is that, by the end, the case for intrinsic theory will he so evidently strong, or at leas t so vivid, that all psychologists of consciousness will have to addre ss intrinsic theory and its explanandum of consciousness(4). In this a rticle, I set the stage by (a) rendering some of the relevant meanings explicit, (b) spelling out my purpose and approach to making the case for intrinsic theory, (c) providing some context for the discussions to follow, and (d) mentioning important objections to intrinsic theory that have been voiced in the literature. In the case of an [experienc e] directed to something immanent, or briefly expressed, a perception of something immanent (so-called ''internal'' perception), [experience and experienced] form essentially an unmediated unity, that of a sing le concrete cogitatio. Here the perceiving includes its Object in itse lf in such a manner that it only can be separated abstractively, only as an essentially non-selfsufficient moment, from its Object. (Husserl , 1913/1983,pp. 79-80; his later corrections).