SIZING UP CHINESE MILITARY BUILDUP - THE LIMITATIONS TO DEFENSE MODERNIZATION

This article documents and analyzes China's recent defense modernizati on programs, in particular its arms acquisitions from the United State s and Russia since the early 1980s. It examines how China's changing s ecurity perspectives and the concomitant shifts in strategic doctrines have informed and conditioned the country's defense modernization pri orities and programs. On the one hand, the doctrinal shift from an emp hasis on ''people's war'' to one on ''local war under hi-tech conditio ns'' has highlighted the needs to modernize equipment in several key m ission areas, which remains deficient. On the other hand, China's dome stic defense industry appears unable to provide the kind of sophistica ted weaponry that modern warfare requires. To close this mission-capab ility gap requires imports of both advanced defense equipment and mili tary technology. Significant weapons acquisitions are antithesis to th e long-held principle of self-reliance and may create a politically un acceptable dependence relationship with foreign suppliers; nor is such a quick-fix tactic financially feasible or realistic. Consequently, w hile selective purchases of equipment in high-priority and ''bottlenec k'' areas remain an important policy option, a long-term strategy has been to enhance the overall technological level of the domestic defens e industrial base, with an emphasis on the importation of technology, licensed production, coproduction, and codevelopment of weapons. China 's arms acquisitions from the United States and the Soviet Union or Ru ssia during 1980-95 have shown that major purchases have been limited and selective, and mainly in the areas where the PLA needed immediate equipment improvement, or in the areas where imports could result in m ilitary technology transfers. China's experience with buying US defens e equipment, where actual purchases consistently fell far below what w as allowed, is a clear indication of Chinese approaches. At the same t ime, the recent ''buying spree'' of Russian weaponry notwithstanding, such significant purchases were largely motivated by opportunities (e. g., attractive price and payment arrangements). Even here, Chinese def ense planners have sought to obtain Soviet/Russian military technology , license-production rights, and/or coproduction arrangements. And the recent Sino-Russian agreement on completing the long-stalled sale of Su-27s may clear the way for the transfer of Su-27 production technolo gy to Chinese aerospace industries, with significant long-term implica tions for China's defense modernization and regional military balance. However, in overall terms, China's current abilities to obtain advanc ed defense equipment from abroad will remain limited due both to domes tic resource limitations and to Western (and even Russian) export cont rol policies. Clearly, there are limitations to the pace and scope of Chinese military buildup, which recent analyses tend to overestimate. A more balanced analysis needs to take into consideration opportunitie s as well as constraints that may affect the progress of Chinese defen se modernization.