Although the constitution of India envisages a federal form of governm
ent, its evolution in practice over the years, along with several of i
ts provisions, threatens its definition and disrupts its functioning.
This article in particular deals with the position of the Governor and
with Emergency Powers. It also analyzes two court decisions on the di
smissal of the duly elected state governments of Karnataka in 1989 and
Madhya Pradesh in 1992. In both cases, the proclamation of Emergency
by the President of India was successfully challenged in court, and th
e court asserted its power of judicial review. The article concludes w
ith the observation that while the founding fathers of the Indian cons
titution argued for a strong federal government, they would probably b
e surprised and baffled by the arbitrary and capricious way some of th
e powers have been used by the federal government over the states, par
ticularly those belonging to the opposition.