FROM OBSERVABILITY TO MANIPULATABILITY - EXTENDING THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS FOR REALISM

In recent years there have been several attempts to construct inductiv e arguments for some version of scientific realism. Neither the charac teristics of what would count as inductive evidence nor the conclusion to be inferred have been specified in ways that escape sceptical crit icism. By introducing the pragmatic criterion of manipulative efficacy for a good theory and by sharpening the specification of the necessar y inductive principle, the viability of a mutually supporting pair of argument forms are defended. It is shown that by the use of these form s, taken together, a sequence of inductive arguments could be construc ted, given suitable cases histories to serve as evidence. It also show n that the best inductive argument for the most daring realist claim i s the weakest when compared with similarly structured arguments for le ss daring claims.