AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY OF VOTING RULES AND POLLS IN 3-CANDIDATE ELECTIONS

We report the results of elections conducted in a laboratory setting, modelled on a three-candidate example due to Borda. By paying subjects conditionally on election outcomes, we create electorates with (publi cly) known preferences. We compare the results of experiments with and without non-binding pre-election polls under plurality rule, approval voting, and Borda rule. We also refer to a theory of voting ''equilib ria,'' which makes sharp predictions concerning individual voter behav ior and election outcomes. We find that Condorcet losers occasionally win regardless of the voting rule or presence of polls. Duverger's law (which asserts the predominance of two candidates) appears to hold un der plurality rule, but close three-way races often arise under approv al voting and Borda rule. Voters appear to poll and vote strategically . In elections, voters usually cast votes that are consistent with som e strategic equilibrium. By the end of an election series, most votes are consistent with a single equilibrium, although that equilibrium va ries by experimental group and voting rule.