GROUP DISCUSSION AND COOPERATION IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS

Face-to-face discussion has been shown to increase cooperative behavio r in social dilemmas. Two general explanations of this effect were tes ted: group identity (concern for fellow group members' outcomes) and p erception of consensus (degree of agreement perceived among group memb ers on how to respond to the dilemma). Undergraduate students particip ated in four-person groups in one of four experimental conditions. The four conditions differed in common fate (interdependent outcome in a lottery), face-to-face discussion of the dilemma, discussion of an imp ortant (irrelevant) issue, and no discussion (control). Results indica te that (a) the common fate manipulation neither aroused group identit y nor enhanced cooperation, (b) group identity may not be sufficient t o elicit cooperation in a social dilemma, and (c) the most plausible e xplanation of group discussion effects is members' perceived consensus to cooperate.