BRIDGE PROPOSITIONS, PRODUCTION-FUNCTIONS AND THE MEASUREMENT OF PREFERENCES

In a recent debate in this journal (Kelle and Ludemann, 1995; Lindenbe rg, 1996) over propositions relating the micro to the macro-level in r ational choice theory, Lindenberg has suggested a ''strong theory''. W e contend his criticism of empirical exploration of preferences as bei ng a ''weak theory''. In contrast, we argue that his two ''final'' val ues, well-being and social approval, are (a) arbitrary, (b) have long been refuted by scholars of research on values and value hierarchies, (c) demonstrate that this position results in logically confusing resu lts. Instead, we suggest to develop theories explaining the variance o f all SEU-terms, both subjective probabilities and utilities/costs. We refute as well his second main argument, pertaining to the empirical measurement of preferences. We show that any set of utilities relevant to a given decision situation has to be elicited in exploratory studi es, in order to secure full understanding of the decision situation pr esented to the respondents in the main study. Moreover, we posit that this type of methodology is both feasible and leads to more reliable m easurement.