LABORS SPATIAL PRAXIS AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF CONTRACT BARGAINING IN THEUS EAST-COAST LONGSHORE INDUSTRY, 1953-89

Authors
Citation
A. Herod, LABORS SPATIAL PRAXIS AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF CONTRACT BARGAINING IN THEUS EAST-COAST LONGSHORE INDUSTRY, 1953-89, Political geography, 16(2), 1997, pp. 145-169
Citations number
42
Categorie Soggetti
Geografhy,"Political Science
Journal title
ISSN journal
09626298
Volume
16
Issue
2
Year of publication
1997
Pages
145 - 169
Database
ISI
SICI code
0962-6298(1997)16:2<145:LSPATG>2.0.ZU;2-H
Abstract
This paper examines the production of new geographical scales of contr act bargaining in the United States east coast longshore industry duri ng the post-Second World War period. In particular, it analyses how th e International Longshoremen's Association, which represents east coas t waterfront workers, forged a national contract in response to politi cal challenges by a rival union and economic challenges brought about by the introduction of new labor-saving technologies such as container ization. As a means to equalize working conditions in ports from Maine to Texas the union used strikes, work slowdowns, legal action, politi cal pressure and cargo-handling boycotts to force reluctant employers in 1957 to agree to a master contract covering the North Atlantic peas . Upon completion of negotiations in the North Atlantic, the terms of this master contract were also usually adopted by ports in the South A tlantic and Gulf regions. The implementation of a master contract repr esented a significant change from the system of port-by-port bargainin g which had traditionally dominated labor relations in the industry. I n response, employers subsequently felt compelled to restructure their own organization so that by the 1970s a number of regional employer g roups had formed throughout the industry to negotiate for several port s at once. Following its success in securing a regional master contrac t, in 1977 the union negotiated a national agreement covering a number of items related to job security. However, during the 1980s the incre asing costs of the union's contracts encouraged many West Gulf employe rs to turn to cheaper non-union labor to the point where, in 1986, 11 locals in this region broke with the national union and offered conces sions as a means to preserve work for their members. This schism poses a significant threat to the union's efforts to continue ensuring that all dockers enjoy the same basic contractual rights. The paper shows how struggles over the scare at which bargaining takes place have been fundamental to the development of the industry's economic geography. Furthermore, the fact that groups of dockers adopted an explicitly geo graphical response to the threat of job loss raises questions about ho w workers' activities are theorized in explanations of the production of the economic geography of capitalism. Copyright (C) 1997 Elsevier S cience Ltd