THE INCENTIVE EFFECTS OF PROPERTY TAXES ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Authors
Citation
El. Glaeser, THE INCENTIVE EFFECTS OF PROPERTY TAXES ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, Public choice, 89(1-2), 1996, pp. 93-111
Citations number
17
Categorie Soggetti
Economics,"Political Science
Journal title
ISSN journal
00485829
Volume
89
Issue
1-2
Year of publication
1996
Pages
93 - 111
Database
ISI
SICI code
0048-5829(1996)89:1-2<93:TIEOPT>2.0.ZU;2-U
Abstract
This paper applies the ideas of Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980 ) to local property taxes. When local governments maximize their reven ues, property taxes provide incentives for adequate amenity provision. Local amenity provision determines property values which then determi ne local tax revenues. As long as the demand for housing is inelastic, property-taxes will provide stronger incentives for local governments than lump-sum taxes. As current property values reflect expectations about future amenity levels, property taxes create incentives for even the most myopic government to invest for the future. Local property t axes can also act to limit the incentives of localities to tax; there are cases where higher levels of local property taxes lead to lower ov erall tax burdens. These ideas are applied to the tax reform in the la te 1970s; one reason that tax reform may have been so successful is th at in a period where land prices are driven by many forces other than government amenities, property taxes lose their value as incentive dev ices.