DECENTRALIZATION REFORM IN POST-MAO CHINA - A FRAMEWORK OF CHOICE

This article presents an analytical framework that studies why a Lenin ist central government is willing to share its economic power with loc alities. From the choice theoretic perspective, it identifies differen t central leaders' preferences, traces the exogenous factors in the la rger political and economic environment that frame their choices, and examines the rationale of the actual policies that result from their c hoices as modified by the competing interests of other relevant factor s. It argues that central decisionmakers choose different policies in accordance with their own interests through available institutional ch annels to deal with succession struggles and legitimacy crises. Decent ralization in this sense is regarded as one of the strategies of state control in economic reforms. It maintains that exploration of how the Chinese elites attempt to maintain control over the economy and how C hinese economic policies enter into the power struggle is fundamental to an understanding of Chinese economic reforms. This framework highli ghts the center's perspective of decentralization reforms.