THE CONDITIONAL EFFECT OF VIOLENCE AS A POLITICAL TACTIC - MASS INSURGENCY, WELFARE GENEROSITY, AND ELECTORAL CONTEXT IN THE AMERICAN STATES

Theory: Political elites, in their efforts to exercise social control while maintaining legitimacy, respond to civil unrest by expanding the relief rolls. This response is not guaranteed, however, and is highly dependent upon the numerical strength of the insurgent group, access to democratic electoral institutions, and the relationship between the insurgent group and the rest of society. Hypotheses: The theory is te sted by examining the impact of black insurgency in the United States on AFDC growth. In the absence of effective black electoral access, if insurgency has any impact at all, it should be weakest where white re sistence is strong. In the presence of effective electoral access, ins urgency will have a positive effect on AFDC growth, and will be most e ffective where white resistance is weak, or where black electoral powe r is strong. Methods: Pooled time-series analysis is used to examine g rowth in state AFDC recipient rates during the years 1962-80. Results: The results provide strong evidence that political violence can bring important benefits to insurgent groups in the United States. Benefits are not guaranteed, however, and appear to be contingent upon the hyp othesized contextual variables. In the case of the United States, thes e variables appear to have interacted in a complex fashion to produce a rather unexpected outcome. Political violence was most effective in the areas where white resistance was strongest, due to the dominance o f black electoral power, and where black electoral power was weakest, due to a more tolerant white electorate.