This article examines failure rates in de novo S&Ls that initiated ope
rations during the 1980-1986 period. Overall failure rates are similar
to those for existing institutions but are found to vary significantl
y by location, time of charter, and organizational form. Both univaria
te tests and results from a probability-of-failure model indicate that
inadequate capital, economic stress, poor management of higher risk l
ending allowed by broader powers, and operating inefficiencies contrib
uted significantly to the likelihood of failure. Use of brokered funds
and rapid asset growth are also significantly related to failure like
lihood. interestingly, for those S&Ls which eventually failed, rapid a
sset growth and high proportions of nonperforming assets actually dela
yed the timing of their failure. We interpret this to be the result of
regulatory forbearance. We also find significant differences between
the financial characteristics of de novo and non-de novo S&Ls.