R. Zeckhauser, THE CHALLENGE OF CONTRACTING FOR TECHNOLOGICAL INFORMATION, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United Statesof America, 93(23), 1996, pp. 12743-12748
Contracting to provide technological information (TI) is a significant
challenge. TI is an unusual commodity in five ways. (i) TI is difficu
lt to count and value; conventional indicators, such as patents and ci
tations, hardly indicate value. TI is often sold at different prices t
o different parties. (ii) To value TI, it may be necessary to ''give a
way the secret.'' This danger, despite nondisclosure agreements, inhib
its efforts to market TI. (iii) To prove its value, TI is often bundle
d into complete products, such as a computer chip or pharmaceutical pr
oduct. Efficient exchange, by contrast, would involve merely the raw i
nformation. (iv) Sellers' superior knowledge about TI's value make buy
ers wary of overpaying, (v) Inefficient contracts are often designed t
o secure rents from TI. For example, licensing agreements charge more
than marginal cost, These contracting difficulties affect the way TI i
s produced, encouraging self-reliance. This should be an advantage to
large firms, However, small research and development firms spend more
per employee than large firms, and nonprofit universities are major pr
oducers. Networks of organizational relationships, particularly betwee
n universities and industry, are critical in transmitting TI, Implicit
barter-money for guidance-is common. Property rights for TI are hard
to establish. Patents, quite suitable for better mousetraps, are inade
quate for an era when we design better mice. Much TI is not patented,
and what is patented sets fuzzy demarcations, New organizational forms
are a promising approach to contracting difficulties for TI. Webs of
relationships, formal and informal, involving universities, start-up f
irms, corporate giants, and venture capitalists play a major role in f
acilitating the production and spread of TI.