BARGAINED SHARES IN JOINT VENTURES AMONG ASYMMETRIC PARTNERS - IS THEMATTHEW EFFECT CATALYZING

The impact of asymmetries between partners on the likelihood of establ ishing successful research and development and production joint ventur es relative to the alternative of own development is assessed analytic ally. The often empirically observed 50/50 sharing rule in asymmetric alliances is compared to a bargained rule, where asymmetries in absorp tive capacity, as well as R&D and production efficiency are explicitly taken into account. Industry settings in which successful asymmetric alliances are more likely to occur are pinpointed. The analysis focuse s on the influence of the size and format of these asymmetries, the te chnological appropriability and complementarity between partners on th e incentives for both partners to cooperate as well as to cheat on the venture agreement. The results are compared to a setting where the jo int venture is only involved in R&D.