How are we to understand the difference between evolutionary and histo
rical change in the field of technical practices? One possible answer
hinges on a certain interpretation of the notion of making things, acc
ording to which making consists in bringing an object into conformity
with a design that preexists in the mind of an agent. The history of t
echnics thus is contingent upon a series of intentionally motivated de
sign modifications, whereas in evolution these modifications are broug
ht about, in the absence of a design agent, through variation under na
tural selection. This implies, however, that at some point, history mu
st have ''started up'' from a baseline of evolved capacities shared by
all human beings, past and present. Considering the ways in which hum
ans use their bodies in technical activities, it is commonly supposed
chat they are universally equipped, by virtue of their evolutionary en
dowment, with such innate capacities as bipedal locomotion and speech,
but that these are ''topped up'' with acquired, culturally or histori
cally specific content. The argument of this article, to the contrary,
is that the distinction between innate capacities and acquired conten
t is an artifact of our own analytic attempts to sift the general from
the particular. What actually evolve are skills, regarded as properti
es not of individual bodies but of the whole system of relations const
ituted by the presence of the organism-person in its environment. To u
nderstand the evolution of skill, we therefore have to focus on the wa
y such systems are constituted and transformed over time. In effect, t
he study of evolution becomes the study of how human beings and other
animals, through their actions, establish the contexts of development
for their successors. The implication of this argument, however, is to
dissolve the distinctions not only between the innate and the acquire
d, but also between biology and culture and, above all, between evolut
ion and history.