THE ROLE OF REWARDS IN CONFLICTUAL INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS

Models of international conflict often omit the option of offering rew ards as a means of exerting influence. The author has developed a revi sed version of Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's (1992) international int eraction game that allows states either to offer rewards or threaten m ilitary force once they have made political demands and their adversar y has rejected them. After laying out the game's logic, the author der ives predictions about the conditions under which war occurs and rewar ds are offered and accepted with complete information. The costs of us ing force, relative military capabilities (i.e., the probability of vi ctory in war), and the value of the rewards drive these predictions. T he author also relaxes the complete information assumption and shows h ow uncertainty can affect the choices of both the maker of the demand and the recipient. Finally, the model is illustrated by applying it to two crises: the United States-Japan crisis leading to the Pearl Harbo r attack and the Cuban missile crisis. The variables in the model help to explain both the outbreak of war in the first case and the avoidan ce of war in the second.