BEHAVIORISM AND MENTALISM - IS THERE A 3RD ALTERNATIVE

Authors
Citation
B. Preston, BEHAVIORISM AND MENTALISM - IS THERE A 3RD ALTERNATIVE, Synthese, 100(2), 1994, pp. 167-196
Citations number
27
Categorie Soggetti
History & Philosophy of Sciences","History & Philosophy of Sciences
Journal title
ISSN journal
00397857
Volume
100
Issue
2
Year of publication
1994
Pages
167 - 196
Database
ISI
SICI code
0039-7857(1994)100:2<167:BAM-IT>2.0.ZU;2-E
Abstract
Behaviorism and mentalism are commonly considered to be mutually exclu sive and conjunctively exhaustive options for the psychological explan ation of behavior. Behaviorism and mentalism do differ in their charac terization of inner causes of behavior. However, I argue that they are not mutually exclusive on the grounds that they share important found ational assumptions, two of which are the notion of an inner-outer spl it and the notion of control. I go on to argue that mentalism and beha viorism are not conjunctively exhaustive either, on the grounds that d ropping these common foundational assumptions results in a distinctive ly different framework for the explanation of behavior. This third alt ernative, which is briefly described, is a version of non-individualis m.