CONSTRAINED MAXIMIZATION RECONSIDERED - AN ELABORATION AND CRITIQUE OF GAUTHIER MODELING OF RATIONAL COOPERATION IN A SINGLE PRISONERS-DILEMMA

Gauthier's argument for constrained maximization, presented in Morals by Agreement, is perfected by taking into account the possibility of a ccidental exploitation and discussing the limitations on the values of the parameters which measure the translucency of the actors. Gauthier 's argument is nevertheless shown to be defective concerning the ratio nality of constrained maximization as a strategic choice. It can be ar gued that it applies only to a single actor entering a population of i ndividuals who are themselves not rational actors but simple rule-foll owers. A proper analysis of the strategic choice situation involving t wo rational actors who confront each other shows that constrained maxi mization as the choice of both actors can only result under very deman ding assumptions.