REALISM BEI-FREGE - REPLY TO BURGE

Frege is celebrated as an arch-Platonist and arch-realist. He is renow ed for claiming that truths of arithmetic are eternally true and indep endent of us, our judgements and our thoughts; that there is a 'third realm' containing nonphysical objects that are not ideas. Until recent ly, there were few attempts to explicate these renowned claims, for mo st philosophers thought the clarity of Frege's prose rendered explicat ion unnecessary. But the last ten years have seen the publication of s everal revisionist interpretations of Frege's writings - interpretatio ns on which these claims receive a very different reading. In 'Frege o n Knowing the Third Realm', Tyler Burge attempts to undermine this tre nd. Burge argues that Frege is the very Platonist most have thought hi m - that revisionist interpretations of Frege's Platonism, mine among them, run afoul of the words on Frege's pages. This paper is a respons e to Burge's criticisms. I argue that my interpretation is more faithf ul than Burge's to Frege's texts.