MAKING SENSE OF ON DENOTING

The widely held assumption about what motivated ''On Denoting'' is irr econciable with Russell's position shortly beforehand; but discarding it leaves one with a carefully worked out solution whose problem is mi ssing. The real motivation is to be found in a notoriously obscure pas sage in OD, in which Russell exposes a decisive (though easily overloo ked) flaw in his former theory of denoting; a flaw which also cripples Frege's theory of sense and reference. A comprehensive account of thi s passage is the chief concern of the present paper. Recognizing the c ritical role of this argument of Russell's leads to a more credible ac count of his argumentation in that essay. It also suggests that the fu ndamental standpoint underlying The Principles of Mathematics remains intact. In this light, the appropriation of OD to the philosophy of la nguage may be misguided.