MARKETABLE PERMITS, MARKET POWER, AND CHEATING

Authors
VANEGTEREN H WEBER M
Citation
H. Vanegteren et M. Weber, MARKETABLE PERMITS, MARKET POWER, AND CHEATING, Journal of environmental economics and management, 30(2), 1996, pp. 161-173
Citations number
18
Categorie Soggetti
Business,Economics,"Environmental Studies
Journal title
Journal of environmental economics and management → ACNP
ISSN journal
00950696
Volume
30
Issue
2
Year of publication
1996
Pages
161 - 173
Database
ISI
SICI code
0095-0696(1996)30:2<161:MPMPAC>2.0.ZU;2-9
Abstract
In this paper, we present a model of a noncompliant firm operating in a marketable pollution permit market. In the main result of the paper, we show how compliance is related to the initial distribution of perm its. A firm with market power will cheat less the larger its endowment of permits is from a fixed stock of permits. The competitive fringe, however, will cheat more as its endowment of permits is reduced, gener ating an ambiguous global impact on cheating. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.