Certain familiar theoretic claims of both popular and academic postmod
ernism are examined for their implications as to the necessary and des
irable limits of social life. Taken to the end, these claims promote e
rrancy as a means of freeing conduct from the constraints of foundatio
n. But this kind of freedom, one which treats all limitation as pernic
ious, generates social action that is mechanical, scattered, and witho
ut substance - it is a pyrrhic emancipation which trades content for s
elf-sufficiency and thus constitutes an empty life of unhappy social d
ispersion. And yet an opportunity does remain to address the way a lim
it can also be inspiring if we think through how interpretation, a lim
it which is itself limited, invites nevertheless what Derrida glossed
as ''joyous affirmation.'' Interpretation, though imperfect, offers po
wers that are genuine and enjoyable because these powers supply life w
ith content and thus with the vitalizing collective and individual pos
sibility of conduct which is affirmative (and disaffirmative). Perhaps
it could even be said that interpretation emancipates us from the emp
tiness of pure freedom.