KNOW THYSELF - ARGUMENTS ON THE RELEVANCE OF THE FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE

The paper investigates wether humans can give reliable information abo ut themselves, at least in some respects. In a first step the presuppo sition is discussed that certain concepts of ordinary language which r efer to mental phenomena do not become obsolete and cannot be reduced to observable or physiological phenomena as a result of scientific pro gress. in a second step, the possible inference is critizised that sel f-observation could be a way to assess psychological processes or stat es. These abjections, however, do not diminish the validity and the re levance of knowing and speaking about oneself. rt is argued that a per son's knowledge about mental states and phenomena as well as the possi bility to comprehend these phenomena (e. g. to express them verbally) are constitutive for them. A comprehensive psychology, however, cannot succeed without these mental aspects of human life.