Recent military equipment purchases (e.g., kilo-class submarines from
the former Soviet Union, and Scud B/C missiles from North Korea) have
focused attention on Iran's rearmament program. Concerns have been rai
sed that this program has provided Iran with the capabilities needed t
o achieve military hegemony in the Persian Gulf or the Middle East mor
e generally. This article examines these concerns and seeks to correct
some of the misconceptions that have led to an exaggeration of the re
armament program's scale and importance. First, the nature of the prog
ram is outlined, including threat perceptions, financial limits, milit
ary imports, and domestic military production. Next, Iran's convention
al military capabilities are compared with those of five other regiona
l powers (Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Syria) for the period
1988-1992. This comparison is made from two perspectives: military de
mands upon the financial and human resources of these societies; and,
their respective theoretical ground force capabilities. Finally, Iran'
s capabilities and intentions with respect to weapons of mass destruct
ion are surveyed.